##### Now, instead, imagine that the imbalance of power causes the costs of fighting to be unequally distributed between the two players (you may go back to assuming c > v/2). In particular, suppose one player incurs a cost of c 8 and the other player incurs a cost of 15c 8 . Write down the payoff matrix of this new game and find all pure Nash equilibria. Does the prediction of the model change this time?

Now, instead, imagine that the imbalance of power causes the costs of fighting to be

unequally distributed between the two players (you may go back to assuming c > v/2).

In particular, suppose one player incurs a cost of c

8

and the other player incurs a cost of

15c

8

. Write down the payoff matrix of this new game and find all pure Nash equilibria.

Does the prediction of the model change this time?