##### Imagine that there is an imbalance of power between the two players, and that, if both play hawk, player 1 wins with probably q where 0.5 < q < 1. Assume both players still incur the cost c of fighting. Write down the payoff matrix of this new game.

Imagine that there is an imbalance of power between the two players, and that, if both

play hawk, player 1 wins with probably q where 0.5 < q < 1. Assume both players still incur the cost c of fighting. i. Write down the payoff matrix of this new game. ii. Suppose c > v. Find all pure Nash equilibria. Does the prediction of the model

depend on the likelihood one player wins?

iii. Now, suppose v > c > v/2 and find all pure Nash equilibria. Does the prediction

of the model depend on the likelihood one player wins? How do you interpret your

answers to these last two questions?